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In the

Supreme Court of the State of Utah
In the Matter of the Estate of
EUGENE CRANDALL,
Deceased.
STATE TAX COMMISSION OF UTAH,
Appellant,
vs.

Case No.
8993

VAL GENE CRANDALL, Executor of
the Estate of Eugene Crandall,
Respondent.

APPELLANT'S BRIEF

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Eugene Crandall died testate, a resident of Utah
County, on October 29, 1957. Among the assets of his
estate was an interest in 79 acres of real property situated in Orem, Utah, together with 51 shares of water stock
in the Alta Ditch and Canal Co. and 15 shares of water
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stock in the Provo Reservoir Co. Eugene Crandall held
the said 79 acres together with a brother, Merrill Crandall, and Eliza Crandall, the widow of a deceased brother,
Raphael Crandall, as tenants in common (Tr. 4). At the
time of the death of Eugene Crandall (hereinafter referred to as Decedent) 70 acres had been planted with apple,
pear and cherry trees and the property was being operated as a fruit farm. The remaining 9 acres were sandy
and unproductive ( T. R. 3).
On July 16, 1958 a commission issued out of Fourth
Judicial District Court, Probate Division, appointing
Arnold Mechan1, Elmer W. Bird and K. A. Randall as
appraisers of all property of the estate subject to inheritance tax (R. 46), and on September 1, 1958 the said
appraisers returned their appraisal of all property in
the estate, which was filed with the court on October 1,
1958 (R. 50).
The inheritance tax appraisal described the 79 acres
of land together with its water right, and valued the
smne at 225,000, resulting in the inclusion in decedent's
estate for purposes of inheritance tax of one-third of
such value, or $75,000 (R. 47).
On October 23, 1938 the Executor of Decedent's
estate, Valgene Crandall, filed objections to the inheritance tax appraisal and asked the court to fix the value
of the real estate (H. 28-30). At the hearing on the Executor's objections the estate called three witnesses in support of the Ji~xl'entor 's objections and the state called
two witnesses. Salient points of the testin1ony of each
witness are as follows:
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V algene Crandall, the Executor of the estate was
called. He described the property and the water rights,
and stated that he had worked steadily on the farm for
eleven years, and prior to that time during the summer
(T. 3). He stated that decedent left the property to him,
that is was being operated as a farm, and that he intended
to continue to operate it as a farm (T. 4). He also stated
that in his opinion the land was worth $1,500 per acre,
including the water right (T. 6). On cross-examination
Mr. Crandall stated he would not sell the land even if
offered $5,000 per acre, because he wanted to farm it;
and that the net profit from farming the property during
1957 amounted to $30,000 (T. 7). He further stated that
he knew of no recent sales of other property in the same
area and that he had no idea what the water stock alone
was worth (T. 8).
Ralph Halm was next called by the estate, and after
stating that he operated a real estate office in '0rem,
Utah County (T. 10), he said that he had appraised the
property at $1,500 per acre for the 70 productive acres
and $600 per acre for the nine acres that were unproductive, producing a total value of $110,400 (T. 12). In response to a question as to whether he considered the
water right in his appraisal, Mr. Halm stated:
"Yes, we did determine from the owner that it
was adequate, which we were concerned with in
arriving at the value" (T. 11).
On cross examination, Thir. Hahn stated that in his
opinion the property if sold would bring no more than
the above amount with the water stock inr1uded (T. 13);
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that the "Provo River" water stock by itself was worth
about $240 per share, and that the Alta Ditch stock
varied from "seven fifty to a thousand dollars a share"
(T~ 13-14), but that he had not attempted to value the
water right separately "because what we were concerned
with, was there adequate water with the ground. And if
you took it off the ground, as far as the fruit farm is
concerned, it would be valueless.... " (T. 14). He further
stated that he was aware of other sales of land in the
same area, and that $1,500 per acre is an average value ·
"for fruit ground." (T. 14)
Milton Johnson was then called as a witness for the
estate. He testified generally the same as did Mr. Ralph
;Halm, except that he stated that his appraisal was based
on ,the 1and having water rights, which he identified as
"fifty-one shares of Alta Ditch and Canal Co. and eleven
shares of :Murdock Canal, Murdock irrigation water" (T.
1~). He further stated, "If my office was to solicit listing
for sa~es purposes, 'Ye would not list that less than fifteen
hund~ed dollars per acre" (T. 18). Tie also appraised
the p~rt which V{as unproductive bec.ause of the difficulty
of irrigating it at $600 per acre (T. 18).
Thereupon the estate rested, and the State called
Arnold Mecha1n, one of the inheritance tax appraisers.
Mr. Mecham testified that he had been in the abstracting
business in Utah County about 37 years (T. 21). He
stated' that in his opinion the real property in question,
including the water rights was reasonably w'"orth $225,000,
and that the one-third interest of the decedent was worth
$75,000.00 (T. 23). He further stated that in his opinion
the property was a good location for a subdivision (T. 21).
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On cross-examination Mr. Mecham was examined: as
to his qualifications and knowledge of the property (T~
24-25). He also stated that he believed he knew people
who would give $3,000 per acre for the property, but that
he would have to obtain their consent before naming
them (T. 25).
K. A. Randall, another inheritance tax appraiser, was
next called as a witness for the State. He testified that
he was the vice-president and cashier of the State Bank
of Provo, and that he had acquired a familiarity with
property values through twelve year's experience .in the
loan business in Utah County (T. 26). He testified that
in appraising the property for inheritance tax purposes
he and the other appraisers had discussed the values with
representatives of the estate, and whereas the property
·was being used for farming purposes, its value could not
be tied to the value of that use, since "it has a higher
economic use and would be sold, if it were to be sold on
the market, at a higher level"; and that in his opinion
"the property on the average would be worth $3,000 per
acre" (T. 27).
On cross-exmnination l\1r. Randall testified that he
had appraised other property in the same area. Specifically, he stated he had appraised the property of a Mr.
Stratton, whose property adjoins the property in question here on the west, at a value which would ave!'age
$3,000_ per acre (T. 28). Also, he had appraised the:property of a Mr. Vern Stratton, whose property is "immediately south, across eighth north, and along the brow. Qf
the hill. We have worked with Mr. Clive Pullen who h~

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

6

along eighth north road. We worked with both Howard
Ferguson and with Jim Ferguson, whose property
bounds on the east" (T. 29). He also stated that he felt
it would be possible to sell the property for $3,000 per
acre, and that the highest use of the property would be
for residential purposes (T. 30).
On November 18, 1958 the Probate Court entered its
order adopting the appraisal of Ralph Hahn and JYiilton
Johnson, and determining the value of the "Crandall
fruit farm asset" for inheritance tax purposes at $36,800.
(R. 40-42).
This appeal from the last named order of the court
was then taken.
STATEl\fENT OF POINTS
POINT I.
THE PROBATE COURT ERRED IN ORDERING THAT
THE TRUE APPRAISEMENT VALUE OF THE CRANDALL
FRUIT FARM ASSET IS $36,800.00.
ARGU~iENT

POINT I.
THE PROBATE COURT ERRED IN ORDERING THAT
THE TRUE APPRAISEMENT VALUE OF THE CRANDALL
FRUIT FARM ASSET IS $36,800.00.

It is the position of the State Ta.."X- Conunission that
the Probate rourt went against the dear ·weight of the
evidenc<' in adopting the appraisal1nade by Ralph Halm
and Milton ~Johnson.
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Section 59-12-3, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, provides
as follows:
"The value of the gross estate of the decedent
shall be determined by including the value at the
time of his death ... of all property, real or personal, within the jurisdiction of this state, and
any interest therein, whether tangible or intangible, which shall pass to any person ... by testamentary disposition ... " (Emphasis added.)
By Section 59-3-1, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, the
term "value" is defined as follows :
"In this title, unless the context or subjectmatter otherwise requires:
·
" (5) 'Value' and 'full cash value' mean the
amount at which the property would be taken in
payment of a just debt due from a solvent debtor."
This court has construed the meaning of this definition in the case of Kennecott Copper vs. Salt Lake County, 122 Utah 431, 250 P.2d 938, 939-40, as follows:
"Although the phrase 'the mnount at which
the property would be taken' refers more definitely to the amount at which the creditor would be
willing to accept the property than it does to the
amount the debtor would insist on receiving, still
inherent in this provision is the concept that such
amount must also be agreeable to the ownerdebtor for the creditor could not take the property
at an amount to which the owner-debtor would
not agree. In other words, this is a definiti,on of
(market value.' Althmtgh it speaks in terms of
paying debts and not sale for Ca'Sh, vt VS the price
wh~ch would be agreed upon at .a voluntary sale
between an owner willing to sell and a purchaser

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

8

willing to buy. 18 Am. Jur. 876. It means the~ same
thing as 'just compensatvon' in connect~qn: w,ith_;;
':eminent. domain.' " (Emphasis added.)
With reference to the standard of just c01npensatiori;:
the Court in the ease last cited referred to- the ca~e of
Moyle vs. Salt Lake City, 111 Utah 201, 176 P .2d 882, 888,
wherein the court said :
"It is elemental in eminent domain cases that
the owner is entitled to the value of the property
for the highest and best use to which it could be
put.... "
The linport of the Kennecott Case, supra would seem
to be that the term "value" has the same 1neaning when
it appears in the taxation statutes as it has when it appears 1n the eminent d01nain statutes, and that the "value" of property which should be included in the estate of
a decedent means the value of the highest and best use of
which· the property is presently capable.
It is sub1nitted that the record indicates that the
probate court disregarded this standard of valuation
when it deternrined the value of the property in question.
·The Order of Appraise1nent entered by the court
(R. 40--43) contains no finding as to the lrighest and best
use of this property. The order found 1nerely that the
property was_ being operated as a fruit fa.nn and "that
the true appraisement value for inheritance tax purposes
of the lfa interest in said land and water right which is
an asst~t of tlw ahovp entitled estate. is the sun1 of
$36,800,.,00 as of, the date of said· decedent's d,eath. That
th~ app~·nisement of said fruit fann asset of said estate,
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made by Ralph Hahn and 1\rfilton·G. Johnson, :the appraisal Witnesses at the hearing, which was received ·in evidence and filed· here in; is hereby found: to be true and
correct." (R. 41).
It is apparent from the testimony at the hearing
that :Mr. Halm and :Mr..Johnson in appraising the property gave consideration only to the present use of the
property, i.e., as a fruit farm. Note for example the
following excerpts from Mr. Halm's testimony (T. 11):

"Q.

Now are you acquainted with the .values
of real estate, particularly farming real
estate, in Utah County from your experience~

A.

Yes.
Q. Did you make an examination of the
Crandall fruit farm 1
A. Yes.
* * * * *
Q. Did you consider, of course, the water
right that went with the land in your
appraisalf
A. Yes, we did determine from the owner
that it was adequate, which we were concerned with in arriving at the value."
Mr. Halm testified on cross-examination as follows
(T. 14):

"Q. Are you aware or any other sales o£ land
in that area 1
·A. Yes.
Q. How much does land sell for per acre in
that area~
A. Well, up in that area, that is an average
value for - in my opinion, that is an
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average value,. fifteen hundred for fruit
ground ... " (Emphasis added.)
It is uncontroverted in the record that this property
has a very valuable water right, the estimated value of
. which was $55,000 to $65,000 (T. 27). Yet Mr. Halm and
Mr. Johnson took no account of this valuable asset, except to deterrnine that the 'vater right was "adequate."
Mr. Halm testified ( T. 14) :
"Q. On the basis of this value, how much
would the total water stock be worth f
A. I haven't calculated that. We diJdn't try
to arrive at that figure, because what we
were concerned with, was there adequate
w.ater with the gro·und. And iJf you took it
off the ground, as far as a fruit farm is
concerned, it would be valueless, yo14
know." (Emphasis added.)
In the same vein, l\Ir. J olmson testified (T. 18):
"A. . .. I do quite a lot of independent appraising, and when I was asked to make
this appraisal, I pulled actual transactions which were comparable or even
exceeded comparable value of tracts of
land with product·£ve fruit up into the
twenty acre view lots ..."
Whereas, the testinwny indicates that l\fr. Halm and
1\!r. Johnson based their appraisal upon the value of the
property as a fruit fanu, it is uncontroYerted in the record that the highest and best use of this property is for
residential or snbdiYision purposes. X ote. for example,
·the testilnony of I(. A. Randall (T. 30):
"Q. \Veil, now. you are. basing your opinion
· , S()lely upon what you claim the market
'1
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value of this property to be for the highest use~
A. That is: correct.

Q. What is the highest use'
A. Used for residential purposes."
This view is confirmed b;~ the statement of Mr.
Mecham: "I believe it's a good location for a subdivision"
(T. 21), and certainly is not controverted by the testimony of :Mr. Johnson that this property is within nine
or ten blocks of the nearest subdivision ( T. 20), or the
statement of :Mr. Halm to the effect that, while the property would be suitable for subdividing, other property
would be more suitable c:e. 15).

It might be contended, as it was by the representatives of the estate at the hearing, that the executor does
not want to sell the land or do anything other than continue its present operation as a fruit fann. This, however,
does not n1ean that it is proper to limit the value of the
property for inheritance tax purposes to its value as a
fruit farm.
In 4 Nichols on Eminent Domain, P. 107, Sec. 12.3142
(3d ed. 1951), we find this statement relative to "market
value":
"Market value, as has been previously stated,
is not limited to value for the use to which the
land is actually devoted.
"The most characteristic illustration of the
rule that market value is not limited to value for
the exi~ting use and the situation in which it is
most frequently invoked, and also most frequently
abused, is found in those cases where evidence is
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· offered of what the value~ of a tract of land that
is used for·agricultural purposes or is vacant and
unused would be if cut up into house-lots."
This quotation fr01n Nichols was discussed in a law
review article contained in a: symposium on eminent doInain prohlen1s published in 43 Iowa Law Review 191,
200, Some Ele1nents of DanLage in Condemn-ation, Gardner Cromwell (1958), as follows:
"In seeking to draw the line between prospective and speculative use (and to avoid the abuse
mentioned), courts generally accept proof of
availability for subdivision as it might affect the
market value of the land being considered, but
refuse, as speculative, remote, or conjectural, detailed computations of the number of lots which
could be carved out, and the selling price of each.
This practice is a fair compromise between confining the owner to valuation at the present use
and allowing recovery in specie for the rosiest
dreams of real-estate prmnoters."
This state1nent is significant. because it summarizes
the precise 1nethod recognized by the Utah Court for
settling the clain1s of the parties in a fair 1nanner. In
State vs. Tedesco, 4 U. 2d 248, 250-51, 291 P. 2d 1028, 1029
this court said :
"A reading of the testi1nony of defendants'
experts can lead to no other reasonable conclusion
than that thPY arrived at their detennination of
Parcell's val~1e [Parcell \nls then unsubdivided]
by taking the sales prices of cmnparable lots in the
vicinity, assigning such Yalues to the individual
lots involved in this litigat.ion and adding then1 up,
without eonsidering m1~, cost or expense incident
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. ~ l·i,tq the sale of eayh:.Pf th~ l9,ts or ;th:e ti~e within
.w:hich the lots might b,ave. been sold.
-* *·* * *
"A condemnee is not entitled to realize a profit on his property. It must go to the condemnor
for its fair market value, as is, irrespective of any
claimed value based on an aggregate of val1;1es
o£ individual lots in a subdivision which one hopes
to sell at a future time to individuals rather than
to an individual. The test is not what· the lots will
bring when and if 62 willing buyers come along,
but what the tract, as a unit, and as is, platted or
not, and in whatever state of completion, will
bring from a willing buyer of the whole tract."
In this respect it should be pointed out that the inheritance tax appraisers made no detailed computations
of what individual lots in a subdivision would bring if
sold separately, but rather based their opinion upon what
the entire tract would sell for on an acreage basis for
subdivision purposes. The main difference of opinion at
the hearing seemed to be whether such a computation
was proper in view of the facts that the decedent had
used it as a fruit farm, and that the executor stated that
he wished to continue so to use the property. Note the
following extract from the cross-examination of Mr. Ran\
dall (T. 29-30):
"Q. Well now, you are basing your opinion
solely upon what you claim the market
value of this property to be for the highest use~
A. That is correct.
Q. What is the highest use~
A. Used for residential purposes.
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You have heard two appraisers from
Orem this morning who say that it is fifteen hundred dollars - is the value of
that property on the market'
A. I also heard Mr. Halm say he appraised
it as a fruit farm, and I heard Mr. Johnson say he agreed to the same answer of
Mr. Halm.

Q.

Q. You said something about market value
meaning a buyer who is willing to buy
and a seller who is willing to sell 1
A. That is right.
Q. All right. You heard Mr. Crandall say
he wanted to farm this ground 1
A. That is right.
That it was being farmed at the time his
father died 1
A. That is correct.
Q.

So you have an unwilling [seller],
haven't you 1
A. I don't believe that has any basis on the
valuation.
Q.

Q. You don't 1
A. In what our assignment is from the state
of Utah. If he wants- I an1 not saying
that ~Ir. Crandall has to sell the property.
All I an1 saying is we have a responsibility in our esti1nation to appraise the property."
It is subn1itted that the appraisers en1ployed by the
estate deterrnined the value of the property only from
the standpoint of its present use, and gave no consideration to any other possible use of the property, and that
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in adopting their appraisal the Probate court went
against the clear weight of the evidence.
One other fact disclosed in the record helps substantiate this view. The executor stated on cross-examination
that the property produced $30,000 in net income during
the last year prior to the death of the decedent. In the
case of In Re Clift's Estate, 70 Utah 409, 260 Pac. 859
this court gave recognition to the practice of appraising
incmne producing property by capitalizing the net income
to arrive at the fair market value thereof. In the court's
explanation of the testimony of Edward J\L Ashton, who
had used the net income method, most of the discussion
concerned the computation by which Mr. Ashton arrived
at the net income figure. In the present case the executor
himself supplied the net income figure.
In the Clift case Mr. Ashton capitalized the net income at 6o/o, which the court explained, was about the
average rate of interest on loans secured by real estate
mortgages. In many other cases courts have recognized
the efficacy, during normal years, of using 6% as the
basis for capitalization of net income for determining
market value. Among them are :
LmtisviUe & Nashvvlle R. Co. v. Greene) 244 U.S.
522, 37 S. Ct. 683, 61 L.ed. 1271; Ill. Cent. R. Co. vs.
Greene) 244 U.S. 555, 37 S.Ct. 697, 61 L.ed 1309; Lmtisville & N.R. Co. vs. Coulter 131 Fed. 282, 303; Pleasant
vs. Mo-Ka11r-Tex R~ Co.) 66 F.2d 842; Great Northern R.
vs. Weeks) 297 U.S. 135, 56 S. Ct. 426, 80 L. ed. 532;
Wisconsin Gas & Electrvc Co. vs. TiVisconsin Tax Commiss,ion, 221 Wis. 487, 266 N.W. 186.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

16
Present times might not be considered as normal, so
that the use of 6% as a capitalization factor might not be
proper. However, in order to appraise property which
produces $30,000 worth of net income at $110,400, one
would have to use a capitalization factor of 27%. Certainly the court should take judicial notice of the fact
that present day interest rates on loans secured by real
estate mortgages do not approach 27%.
It is, therefore, respectfully submitted that the findings of the Probate Court and its adoption of the appraisal made by Mr. Halm and Mr. Johnson are against the
clear preponderance of the evidence.

CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons Appellant respectfully
contends that this court should reverse the findings of the
Probate Court, and affirm the appraisal as made by the
inheirtance tax appraisers, or at the very least, should
remand the case for the taking of more complete evidence
upon the question of the fair n1arket value of the property
in question.
Respectfully submitted,
E. R. CALLISTER,
Attorney General of Utah
JOHN G. MARSHALL
BEN E. RAWLINGS
DAVID E. WEST
GORDON A. MADSEN
Asst. Attorneys General,

Attorneys for Appellant.
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